Homelessness as a Crime: Hungary’s Legislative Efforts to Punish Poverty on the Streets

Adél Albert-Tóth, Stefan van Tongeren & Els Schipaanboord

Hungary’s political landscape underwent a significant shift in 2010 with the return to power of the Fidesz-KDNP alliance – led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – following their initial governance from 1998 to 2002. Since their landslide victory, earning them an absolute majority of seats in the first round of the elections and a two-thirds ‘supermajority’ in the second round, the Party has won all elections in 2014, 2018, and 2022, further reinforcing its political dominance. Immediately following the 2010 elections, the newly installed government began drafting what would become one of its most important legislative acts: a new constitution that would succeed the country’s 1991 Constitution, titled the Alaptörvény (the ‘Fundamental’ or ‘Basic’ Law).

The new Basic Law has been widely criticised by legal scholars both inside and outside Hungary as well as by the European Parliament, having been characterised as representing a “constitutional counter-revolution” after the 1989-90 (constitutional) transition from a dictatorship to democracy. The new constitution allowed for the entrenchment of a conservative, single-party state and enabled the erosion of the rights of non-heterosexuals and non-Christians. Furthermore, in certain matters (e.g. taxation, pensions), new legislation could only be enacted with a supermajority vote instead of a simple majority vote, further consolidating the political influence of the Fidesz-KDNP alliance. These constitutional changes, combined with a lasting supermajority, enabled Fidesz-KDNP to create a centralised and increasingly autocratic state, exerting significant influence over other branches of power. One notable example is the judiciary, where the parliament appoints Constitutional Court judges upon nomination by the National Court Office, an institution whose leader is, in turn, nominated by the President and appointed by Parliament. This process has led to a discernible political bias in judicial rulings.

Democratic backsliding in Hungary under the Fidesz-KDNP government since 2010 has intensified over the past decade. Rather than prioritising the provision of adequate social support to citizens, government policy has been criticised for emphasising the appearance of a functioning welfare state without fully addressing underlying social needs. One way in which this becomes particularly evident is the government’s approach to homelessness.

Rather than addressing the underlying causes of homelessness, the government has chosen to criminalise and detain homeless individuals in an effort to create the illusion that homelessness is not a problem in Hungary.

Research indicates that homelessness remains a significant and persistent issue, both in Hungary and across Europe. In a recent decision, the European Committee of Social Rights, for example, found several violations of the European Social Charter by France, citing the proliferation of local regulations on begging, following its decriminalisation at the national level in the Criminal Code. A similar trend can be observed in the Netherlands, where the status of being homeless was decriminalised at the national level in 2000, while at the municipal level begging is often prohibited, treated as a criminal offence, and subject to sanctions. Furthermore, the UN Special Rapporteurs on the right to adequate housing and on extreme poverty and human rights have described laws that criminalise homelessness as “cruel and counterproductive”, and have called on governments to abolish such measures. This blog focuses on the criminalisation of homelessness in Hungary and examines the role politics has played in shaping this process over the past decade and a half.

Homelessness and the new Hungarian Basic Law (2011)

The initial objective of the Fidesz-KDNP coalition was to support homeless individuals through regulatory measures, which they incorporated into programmatic provisions of the newly adopted Constitution. The 2011 Basic Law provides that “Hungary strives to ensure decent living conditions and access to public services for everyone.” A supplementary explanation added to the Constitution clarifies that the purpose of this provision is to prevent homelessness by providing basic living conditions to the greatest extent possible. It further states that the State should strive to ensure the availability of resources essential for subsistence and social inclusion, within the limits of technical feasibility. This implies that the use of state regulatory instruments was considered as the primary means of ensuring decent living conditions for its citizens.

However, this initial act, which appeared to prioritise the rights of people who experience difficulties maintaining basic living conditions, was challenged in December 2011, when the Hungarian Parliament adopted the new Act CLXXXIX on Local Government in Hungary (hereafter: the 2011 Act). Among other things, the 2011 Act authorised local governments to criminalise living in public spaces and to define other forms of prohibited ‘anti-community’ behaviour, without requiring them to provide citizens with assistance in obtaining adequate housing.

In 2012, the Hungarian Constitutional Court subsequently declared these parts of the 2011 Act unconstitutional and annulled it, holding that homelessness is a social rights issue that cannot be addressed through (punitive) regulatory measures.

In the years that followed, the Fidesz-KDNP government consistently employed a political strategy centred around three key steps: first, identifying or creating an enemy or problem; second, defining and exaggerating the issue; and finally, presenting itself as the sole solution to that problem. This method has been a cornerstone of the party’s political success, allowing them to win public approval and consolidate their power. Yet before the 2018 Parliamentary elections in April, another right-wing party, Jobbik, led by Gábor Vona, began gaining more popularity. Although the anticipatory polls’ statistics still reflected a win by Fidesz, whether they would achieve a supermajority was uncertain. As Fidesz’s main political claim is that they are for a safe and family-friendly Hungary, the rising homelessness crisis would go against this image. In this case, rather than implementing genuine, significant reforms with practical effects, their approach to homelessness served primarily as a minor objective that could also help with winning the elections. The issue of homelessness has mainly been used as an instrument to discredit the previous government and reinforce Fidesz-KDNP’s image as a force for societal order and economic stability.

To convince voters of the effectiveness of their actions, the government claimed to have “solved” the issue of homelessness through the initial steps towards its criminalisation, and by means of a public works programme (közmunkaprogram). This programme, typically aimed at citizens with lower levels of education and from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, provides participants with a low wage and, according to the government, homeless people with a possibility to reintegrate into society. With salaries that are guaranteed to be at least 50% of the national minimum wage, however, incomes of participants remain far below the Hungarian poverty line. In 2021, full-time participants received a gross monthly salary of HUF 85.000 (approximately €210); in 2024, this had increased to HUF 133.000 (approximately €329), insufficient to meet basic living costs.

Criminalisation of homelessness after 2018

Although the Fidesz-KDNP government has consistently utilised its supermajority in the Hungarian Parliament to implement sweeping legislative changes, for a brief period in 2018, it  lost its supermajority following the death of one of its Members of Parliament, resulting in the election of an independent MP. After the parliamentary elections in April 2018, however, Orbán’s party once again secured a supermajority. Despite public dissatisfaction with the 2011 Act and the Constitutional Court’s ruling that it was unconstitutional, Parliament decided to amend the Basic Law in order to remove any legal obstacles to the government’s efforts to criminalise homelessness.

New legislation openly targeting homeless people through procedural rules was introduced in a Government decree in October 2018, which prohibited habitual residence in public areas. Upon violation of this law, authorities may confiscate the offender’s belongings and refer them to a homeless shelter. If individuals refuse or are not willing to cooperate, they may face prosecution in court. It is believed that this criminalisation goes against the Basic Law too, as the government has a positive obligation to promote the avoidance, prevention and elimination of homelessness, as well as provide basic living conditions to the greatest extent possible. As a result, the measure faced significant criticism from both the public as well as legal professionals.

In October 2018, an appeal was filed with the Constitutional Court following a decision by the Kaposvár District Court concerning the 2018 criminalisation. The applicant argued that the decree violated human dignity and the right to freedom as guaranteed in the Basic Law, and that the interference did not meet the necessary conditions set out in the Basic Law. According to the Basic Law, restrictions on fundamental rights must be necessary, proportionate to the intended aim, and must respect the essential content of the fundamental right in question. Additionally, the applicant pointed out that existing legislation already regulate issues such as begging, disorderly behaviour, and noise nuisance in public spaces.

While the 2018 Government Decree was interpreted by the Constitutional Court as directly criminalising the status of homelessness, it held that the appeal contesting the criminalisation was unfounded. The Constitutional Court argued that the habitual use of public space inevitably infringes upon the rights of others and has the potential to disturb public order. It therefore rejected the appeal on all legal grounds, thereby upholding the constitutionality of the criminalisation of such conduct.

The Court’s decision was met with criticism and scepticism, partly because it previously held similar legislation to be unconstitutional in 2012, and partly because it took a considerable amount of time to decide the case, despite the Constitution stipulating that matters initiated by lower court judges must be settled within ninety days. This delay in the decision-making process, which lasted until the end of the European Parliament elections, raised concerns about possible political motivations behind the timing of the ruling.

Recent procedural changes that may affect the criminalisation

During his annual address in February 2025, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán made a controversial statement in the presence of party members and allies: “Let’s write it into the constitution that a person is either a man or a woman. And that’s it. In fact, I advise that the pride organizers not bother with preparing this year’s parade. Waste of money and time.” On 18 March 2025, the Hungarian Parliament voted in favour of modifying a previous law that restricted the freedom of assembly in certain instances, where it would violate ‘children’s rights’, allowing the government to ban the Pride demonstration in 2025.

While national and international media focused primarily on the Parliament’s decision to ban Pride events, several other amendments adopted on the same day received less attention. Among these were a set of procedural changes aimed at strengthening the enforcement of new restrictions. Notably, an amendment was made to the 2015 law regulating the use of facial recognition technology in public spaces. Whereas the original purpose of this law was to maintain facial profile records, the amended version expands its purpose to include “preventing, deterring, detecting, and disrupting violations, and holding perpetrators accountable.” These legislative changes raise significant concerns about the scope and potential future application of the system, also in light of the criminalisation of homelessness. For example, will it be used to pursue minor offences such as littering, begging, disorderly conduct, or noise nuisance in public spaces? Will it lead to increased criminalisation of homelessness? The expanded mandate of facial recognition technology suggests a growing tendency toward surveillance-based governance and the potential targeting of vulnerable populations.

Since the enactment of the criminalisation, relatively few arrests of homeless people have taken place, despite their numbers continuing to grow. This lack of enforcement may be attributed to a degree of leniency on the part of the authorities. According to Attila Szabó, “police officers may believe that punitive measures – such as fines or detention – fail to address the root causes of homelessness and therefore inhumane or believe that the initiating proceedings is unmanageable and complicated”. Instead, authorities often support the idea that subsidies and social support are more appropriate solutions. However, the recent modification concerning the procedural use of facial recognition software may reduce the role of individual police officers’ discretion in enforcing laws criminalising homelessness. Instead, cases could be processed through a more centralised system, in which police stations refer cases to a separate central institution (Nemzeti Szakértői és Kutató Központ), which operates the facial recognition system.

Conclusion

The current situation regarding homelessness in Hungary has continued to deteriorate. A recent count of all the homeless people in Budapest showed that around 1.000 to 1.500 people live on the streets, and 5.000 people in homeless shelters. Many of these individuals became homeless after they lost their jobs during COVID-19; others include, for example, pensioners for whom the minimum pension (HUF 28.500, approximately €75) is insufficient to meet basic living costs.

In a recent statement, a Fidesz-KDNP politician remarked that “in order not to become homeless, it is enough if someone just works”. This comment appears to reflect the government’s attitude towards homelessness, framing it as a personal failing rather than a systemic or social issue.

Previous legislative measures appear to have been aimed primarily at appeasing voters rather than constituting genuine attempts to address the underlying causes of homelessness.

What is more, research has shown that the criminalisation of homelessness is ineffective in addressing the underlying causes of homelessness and keeps “people experiencing homelessness living on the streets under constant threat”. For that matter, the CESCR has urged the Netherlands, for instance, to take measures to abolish laws that criminalise people experiencing homelessness, whether directly or indirectly. Seeing that the number of homeless individuals in Hungary has doubled over the past decade, Hungary’s pledge to end homelessness by 2030, as outlined in the Lisbon Declaration, appears increasingly unattainable without substantial policy changes.

Despite the current bleak situation in Hungary, an optimistic wind is now flowing through the country. With the upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for 12 April 2026, Fidesz, the party of Victor Orbán, appears to be facing its strongest challenger since 2010: a relatively new political party Tisza, formed in 2024 and led by Péter Magyar. Polls at the time of writing suggest growing support for Tisza, predicting that around 50% of voters may support the party compared with approximately 39% for Fidesz. Regardless of the outcome of the coming elections, however, it is clear that building back democratic principles will be a lengthy and complex process.